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Puroose of Paoer 
1. The need for a stabilization mechanism for use in funding the 
CGIAR was analyzed in a paper l/ prepared by the CGIAR Secretariat, dated 
April 18, 1983, that was discuysed by the Group at its May 1983 meeting in 
Paris. At that meeting the Group collectively welcomed the concept of a 
stabilization mechanism, recognizing that it addressed important funding 
and program management issues at the centers. It also welcomed the 
willingness of the World Bank to provide start-up funds for such a 
mechanism. The Group requested the CGIAR Secretariat to prepare a paper 
explaining how it would operate and be administered. The stabilization 
mechanism was discussed with Center Directors and TAC at their meeting in 
Tunis in June - July 1983, where both groups strongly supported it. This 
paper deals with the purpose of the stabilization mechanism and how it will 
function and be administered. The paper will be discussed by the Group at 
International Centers Week 1983. 
Background 
2. As indicated in the April 1983 paper, uncertainty about funding 
levels extending well into the budget year has become an important concern 
of centers. The degree of uncertainty about funding, which has increased 
over the last few years, has caused difficulties in financial planning for 
the centers and has led in some cases to suboptimal use of funds. At the 
beginning of the year, with a considerable proportion of the total funding 
uncertain, centers have tended to be conservative and set program levels 
well below their approved programs. Recruitment of staff to fill vacancies 
and the starting of new programs have been postponed. When, later in the 
year, available funds came close to the approved program level it has been 
too late to use the funds for the postponed activities. Instead, the funds 
have been used for replacement of equipment, capital expenditures, increase 
in working capital, creation of new reserves, or have had to be carried 
forward to the following year. A more accurate assessment of the likely 
availability of funds earlier in the year would have permitted a more 
efficient use of the contributions received. 
3. Three factors cause this uncertainty: (a) lack of timely 
knowledge of donors' contributions and of their allocation among centers, 
(b) fluctuations in the dollar value of contributions pledged and disbursed 
in currencies other than the US dollar; and (c) uncertainty with respect to 
levels of inflation and the movement of exchange rates for currencies in 
which expenditures are made. 
1/ CG/83/06. 
-2- 
4. The remedy to the first of these factors lies with donors. 
Timely notification o f donors' contributions and allocations among centers 
is very important. In January 1982 the secretariat advised centers of the 
funding prospects for 1982 based on information received from donors at or 
after 'ICW 1981. Of the total amount of contributions estimated at that 
time, two thirds were confirmed and allocated among centers. The exact 
amount and allocation of the balance was uncertain. In January 1983 only 
one third of the total contribution for 1983 had been confirmed and 
allocated. 
5. Some donors, for institutional reasons,' are not in a position to 
provide firm information on either the level of their contributions or 
their allocation until well into the year. This is mainly the case for 
those donors whose fiscal years do not correspond to the calendar year used 
by the CGIAR system. Since some major donors are in this position, the 
dollar amount involved is quite substantial. Uncertainty about what donors 
will eventually do in turn causes the World Bank, acting as donor of last 
resort, to postpone allocating its funds until well into the 
can compound the problem for the centers. 
year. This 
6. Donors are therefore urged to provide the secretar iat as early as 
possible with information on the level and allocation of the ir 
contributions. Donors confronted with differences in fiscal years could 
perhaps give a general indication that would permit the secretariat to make 
reliable estimates. For example, they might confirm that neither the 1 
system nor any center would receive less than the year before in terms of 
donor currency. All donors are also urged to avoid changing patterns of 
planned contributions during the year (such as shifts between core and -i 
special project funding). 
1 
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Purpose of Fund 
7. Incomplete or uncertain information on donors' contributions and 
their allocation among centers is an important factor of instability, as 
are changes in donor intentions during the year. It is not desirable, 
however, that the stabilization mechanism be used to make up for shortfalls 
in contributions by donors to the system, or to individual centers, because 
this could constitute a disincentive for donors to contribute as much as 
possible. 
8. Over the longer term it is hoped that the funds at the disposal 
of the system for stabilization may become large enough so that they can 
help the system to adjust to major shifts in the level of contributions. 
A significant reduction in level could occur from one year to the next 
through voluntary or involuntary action by one or more important donors. 
Such an event could have a serious impact on the centers affected. A 
stabilization fund large enough to ease such a transition is not in sight 
for the present. However, for this and other reasons it is desirable to 
manage the stabilization fund so as to build up its level from year to 





9. The principal purpose to which the stabilization mechanism could 
be devoted in 1984, would be to compensate centers for two kinds of 
unforeseen losses; for losses caused by variations in the exchange rates of 
the currencies in which contributions are made, and losses due to 
unforeseen inflation not compensated by changes in the exchange rates of 
the currency in which expenditures are made. Unforeseen problems of other 
kinds, (but not, as noted above, failure of a donor to make a pledged or 
expected contribution) would also be considered as grounds for the use of 
stabilization resources. Other remedies, such as emergency contributions, 
would be considered as well. s 
10. In addition to making payments to centers, the fund would also 
receive payments from centers that obtained windfall gains because of the 
same kinds of events. 
11. Since it is not desirable to make a lot of small payments into or 
out of the stabilization fund, and since the calculation of some of the 
changes involved cannot always be precise, payments would not be made if 
the changes involved were minimal. 
12. In addition, some account needs to be taken of the overall 
financial condition of the particular center in relation to that of other 
centers. It would not seem appropriate, for example, to make payments from 
the stabilization fund to a center that has received contributions putting 
it at the top of or above its approved bracket, when other centers were 
close to the bottom of the bracket. Similarly, a center below the bottom 
of the bracket should not be asked to give up a windfall, if other centers 
are doing much better in relation to their approved budget levels. 
Operational Procedures 
13. At the beginning of the year the secretariat would advise 
centers, as it does now, of the pledges made and amounts allocated to each 
center on the basis of information which the secretariat considers 
reliable. The exchange rate used would be that for January 1, or a date 
shortly before. Any difference between this rate and the exchange rate in 
effect when the center actually received the contribution would be a 
potential claim on, or obligation to, the stabilization fund. There should 
be few problems, working with the centers, in calculating the amount 
involved. 
14. All centers' budgets have a built-in provision for price 
increases which is assessed on the basis of: (a) distribution of 
expenditures among different currencies used; (b) estimated domestic 
inflation in centers' host countries and other countries where they 
operate; (c) estimated fluctuation of these countries' currencies against 
the US dollar; and (d) estimated inflation rate in the US dollar market. 
These estimates have to be made 18 to 24 months in advance and are subject 
to large errors. If it transpired during the year that the combined effect 
of all four factors had resulted in a significant underestimation of the 
overall price provision for any one center, that center would have a 
potential claim on the stabilization fund. If it transpired that such 
factors had been substantially overestimated, there would be a potential 
claim by the fund on the center. 
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15. Identification of changes in exchange rates is a relatively 
simple matter. Assessment of the impact of inflation is more complex, 
particularly when dealing in a variety of markets, as is the case 
for all centers. Although price changes shown in cost of living indexes 
are not always good proxies for the price changes actually experienced by 
centers, there is no agreed methodology yet for a better approach. 
Moreover, information is collected and becomes available only after 
considerable delays. Some kinds of price changes are a result of 
management decisions, and are thus appropriate for consideration in the 
budget process. For example, the level of salary increases may fall into 
this category. Others may be outside management control. For example, the 
level of salaries and benefits may be dictated by decisions of local or 
national authorities. The secretariat will be in close touch with the 
centers on a continuous basis, to review price changes in countries where 
major expenditures are made by the centers, as well as any other changes 
affecting the centers and, to compare them with the assumptions built into 
the centers' budgets. 
16. At the end of September each year potential claims would be 
calculated for each center. Payments would then be made to the center, or 
a contribution requested from the center. Additional potential claims for 
the balance of the year would be considered as they arose. 
Funding and Management 
17. The stabilization fund would be open to contributions from CGIAR - 
members, preferably out of increments to their regular contributions to the 
CGIAR supported centers' programs. - 
i 
18. Funds will accumulate through contributions from donors, balances 
rolled over from one year to the next, proceeds of investing the monies and 
funds paid in by the centers. 
19. If for any reason a center is not able to make a payment to the 
stabilization fund duri,ng the year in which the obligation is incurred, the 
obligation would be carried over into the next year. 
20. The secretariat would manage the funds with the assistance of the 
World Bank (for investment) and report each year at Centers Week on the 
status of the fund. This would include the level of funding, proceeds from 
investment and how the funds had been used to the benefit of the centers 
and/or the system. An audited statement would be provided each year. 
Establishment of the Fund 
22. The World Bank has increased its contributions for 1984 from 10% 
to 12.5% of estimated requirements. to allow the establishment of a 
stabilization fund. It is proposed that the stabilization fund be set up 
immediately after the Group has given its consent, using the World Bank 
contribution only, if necessary. 
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23. The initiation of the stabilization mechanism in 1984 depends on 
the Group's agreement. It also depends on the level of funding provided 
by donors in 1984. The Group will probably not wish to initiate a 
stabilization fund at the expense of cutting deeply into centers' approved 
1984 programs and budgets. If available funds do not reach, or only barely 
reach, the minimum funding requirements of 1984, as recommended by TAC, the 
Group might wish to postpone the initiation of the mechanism and use all 
. available funds to support the 1984 programs. 
24. The funding prospects for 1984 will be presented to the Group by 
the secretariat based on pledges made during Centers Week. At that time, 
the secretariat will make a recommendation regarding the amount to be set 
aside for the stabilization mechanism in 1984. When approving centers' 
programs and budgets for 1984, as recommended by TAC, the Group will also 
be asked to approve the amount set aside for the stabilization mechanism. 
The Group should also provide the secretariat with guidance on the action 
to be taken should the funding situation change markedly in the interval 
between International Centers Week and the opening of fiscal 1984. 
25 ,, If the concept and approach to the operation of the stabilization 
mechanism is approved, and funding prospects permit, the secretariat will 
notify centers of 1984 funding prospects in the context of a stabilization 
mechanism as described above. The secretariat will subsequently report to 
the Group at each meeting, and between meetings as required, on the status 
and use of the stabilization mechanism. 
Next Steps 
26. The Group is asked to approve the proposed concept and operating 
modalities described above so that, if funding prospects for 1984 permit, 
the stabilization mechanism can be set up immediately. 
27. Those donors who can contribute to such a mechanism under the 
modalities set out above (e.g. delegating management authority to the 
secretariat, allowing funds to be invested and held indefinitely) are asked 
to inform the secretariat of their willingness to contribute, the amount of 
the contribution and the timing of its disbursement. 
